


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CIA / SAVA / WVIND 720610



WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

Week Ending 10 June 1972







NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.

For the President Only







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SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

1968-1972
Weekly average for each month



MARCH 1972 — JUNE 1972
Weekly data as reported



Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

decreased to 6 from last week's 11.

declined to 408 from the 471 of last week. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than the figures released to the press by the GVN.

include two special purpose groups totaling 721 personnel. The estimate of infiltrators destined for Cambodia-South Vietnam since 1 October 1971 is now some 119,300 - 121,300.

fell sharply to 142 from the 681 of last week.

dropped from last week's 4,314 to 3,719.

as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by GVN forces remained at 99%, the same level as the previous week.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

In South Vietnam, the lull in enemy-initiated activity was broken by a rash of attacks throughout the Delta at week's end. Friendly forces repulsed the attacks for the most part, but the movement of additional North Vietnamese troops from Cambodia into MR 4 in conjunction with the reduced ARVN presence presages further fighting in the Delta, especially in the provinces just to the south of Saigon. Elsewhere, the relative quiet of the past ten days or so has continued, with the South Vietnamese making limited probes against Communist forces attempting to regroup and resupply in preparation for their next round of attacks. Significant concentrations of enemy forces near Hue, Kontum, and Phu My (Binh Dinh Province), make it likely that new action will occur in these areas in the near future.

The overall military situation in Laos was quiet. The most significant action took place on the Long Tieng front, where units involved in the government campaign to retake the ridgeline southwest of the Plain of Jars made little headway and had to fight off several enemy counterattacks. On the border between northern Laos and Thailand, a government sweep operation south of Ban Houei Sai has run into fairly heavy enemy opposition.

Military activity in Cambodia during the week remained generally light. Although the Communists made no systematic efforts to disrupt the presidential election, at midweek they hit the Phnom Penh area again with 122mm rockets. The Ministry of Defense building in the capital, and the city's rail yards, apparently were the primary targets. A simultaneous and heavier shelling attack coupled with sapper activity in an area some eight miles south of Phnom Penh killed 20 Cambodians and almost destroyed a tire factory. Elsewhere in Cambodia, the Communists continued to put pressure on important lines of communication.

Enemy Infiltration and Logistics

The acceptance of 721 personnel during the week brings the estimate of North Vietnamese infiltrators destined for Cambodia and South Vietnam to some 119,300 - 121,300. The status of the 5,500 infiltrators backed up at Vinh on 26 May remains uncertain; we still have no firm evidence as to whether they have yet moved southward into the infiltration pipeline.

The North Vietnamese began major efforts during the week to launch a large-scale overland resupply effort from China. Since 7 June, heavy southbound truck traffic has been reported nightly on Route 1A between Lang Son (near the Chinese border) and Hanoi. On the night of 9 June, 2,700 to 3,600 trucks were noted along the entire 90 mile segment -- about four times the number observed on the 7th. This level of traffic could have transported as much as 14,400 tons of supplies during the one night of the 11th. U.S. air strikes destroyed a number of the trucks, produced numerous secondary explosions, and caused a "continuous wall of flame" at one choke point. The extent of disruption to the truck movements, however, cannot yet be determined. In the area of North Vietnam below Hanoi, a recent message stated that a new storage facility would be built, apparently near Vinh, to "create a cargo base to the front." Within South Vietnam, the Communists have moved additional logistic forces from the Lao Panhandle into northern MR 1 to facilitate the continued flow of supplies to that area.

Communist Political Developments

Several additional signs have appeared during the week that North Vietnamese and Viet Cong leaders are increasingly concerned over the present course of the war.

_____ allege that representatives of Hanoi and the PRG in Paris have recently admitted that U.S. bombing has created serious morale problems in North Vietnam. In addition, according to these reports, Hanoi's military leadership had originally

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believed that many ARVN soldiers would refuse to fight in the face of the heavy NVA assaults of April and May, but the North Vietnamese now recognize that they underestimated the strength and staying power of the South Vietnamese Army. Both of these reports suggest -- in tone more than in explicit language -- that Hanoi may now want an end to the war, and might accept terms somehow different from those on which it previously insisted. Nevertheless, since both reports also indicate that North Vietnam is standing pat on its basic demand that the Thieu government be ousted, it is difficult to discern whether any meaningful change of Hanoi's negotiating position is actually in the wind. The validity of the reports themselves presents a further problem.

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at least partially confirm that North Vietnamese and PRG officials in Paris (including Madame Nguyen Thi Binh) have made statements indicating that the offensive was not going well for Hanoi, and that Saigon's troops were fighting more effectively than expected. At the same time,

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has reported that he sees no signs of serious morale problems in North Vietnam as yet, even though there is clear evidence of substantial disruption to the daily lives of the people. Although

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